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In June 2007, Pfizer announced that members of its board of directors,
including the chairpersons of three its key board committees, would meet with
representatives from some of its largest institutional investors to hear their
concerns.1 In the aggregate, the represented investors owned approximately thirtyfive percent of Pfizer‟s shares.2 Within hours, Marty Lipton, one of America‟s legal
legends, issued a bulletin to his clients decrying this step as “another example of
corporate governance run amuck.”3 It is likely that he meant “amok,” as in frenzied,
with intent to kill, rather than “amuck,” which means mired in mud; however, either
word may fit his thesis. More seriously, Lipton saw Pfizer‟s action as a substantial
step down a slippery slope toward destruction of the modern corporate model that
has been a critical engine of our nation‟s economic growth for the past century.4
Though Lipton is no Chicken Little, he saw the Pfizer announcement as a sign that
the sky is falling on the traditional director-centric model of corporate governance
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1

Press Release, Pfizer Inc., Pfizer Board of Directors to Initiate Face-to-Face Meetings with
Company‟s Institutional Investors on Corporate Governance Policies and Practices (Jun. 28, 2007),
available
at
http://www.pfizer.com/news/press_releases/pfizer_press_releases.jsp?rssUrl=http://mediaroom.pfi
zer.com/portal/site/pfizer/index.jsp?ndmViewId=news_view&ndmConfigId=1006533&newsId=20
070628005559&newsLang=en.
2

Id.

3 Memorandum

of Martin Lipton from Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz to clients, Directors Face-toFace Meetings with Institutional Investors on Corporate Governance Policies and Practices (Jun. 28,
2007), available at http://www.realcorporatelawyer.com/pdfs/wlrk062907.pdf.
4 See

id.
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and, with that, on the efficiency of the corporate form as a capital raising and
economic production model.5
Others in the corporate governance dialogue, most prominently Professor
Lucian Bebchuk of Harvard Law School, argue an opposing brief.6 In Bebchuk‟s
view, the traditional corporate model has failed, not because of too much
shareholder interference with corporate strategy and direction, but because of
imperial, over-compensated chief executive officers (“CEOs”) and uninvolved
boards of directors, who are selected by corporate managers and are not effective
monitors on behalf of investors.7
Professor Bebchuk, other academics, and a host of activist investor
advocates have called for a number of remedies for this supposed failure of the
director agency model, including:
 direct shareholder access to the corporate proxy to nominate director
candidates;8
 elimination of staggered terms for directors;9
 substitution of majority for plurality voting in uncontested director
elections;10
5 See

generally id. (“There is no justification for revolutionizing corporate law and corporate practices so
that shareholders replace directors as the fundamental arbiters of corporate policy. Basic corporate
law and corporate practices, as they have developed and evolved over the past [fifty] years, is the only
proven vehicle for organizing and deploying capital on the large and dynamic scale of the modern
United States economy. It should not be overturned by desperate attempts to appease
deconstructionist activists.”).
6

See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth of the Shareholder Franchise, 93 VA. L. REV. 675 (2007)
[hereinafter Bebchuk, The Myth]; Lucian A. Bebchuk, Reply: Letting Shareholders Set the Rules, 119 HARV.
L. REV. 1784 (2006) [hereinafter Bebchuk, Shareholders Set the Rules]; Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Case for
Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. L. REV. 833 (2005) [hereinafter Bebchuk, Shareholder Power].
7

Bebchuk, The Myth, supra note 6, at 676-82; Bebchuk, Shareholders Set the Rules, supra note 6, at 178486, 1813; Bebchuk, Shareholder Power, supra note 6, at 836-37.
8 Bebchuk,
9

The Myth, supra note 6, at 696-97; Bebchuk, Shareholders Set the Rules, supra note 6, at 1795.

Bebchuk, The Myth, supra note 6, at 700-01; Bebchuk, Shareholders Set the Rules, supra note 6, at 1795.

10 Bebchuk,

Shareholders Set the Rules, supra note 6, at 1797.
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 elimination of super-majority requirements for shareholder approval of
changes in charter documents;11
 separation of the board chair and CEO positions;12 and
 corporate reimbursement for dissidents who have partial success in a proxy
contest.13
Most recently, with increased publicity and negative public reaction about senior
executive compensation, activist advocates have also called for an annual, nonbinding shareholder referendum on whether the directors did a good job on setting
executive compensation–so-called “say on pay” resolutions.14
This year, Professor Bebchuk has also submitted proxy proposals to eleven
companies asking that the corporations establish a procedure whereby any
shareholder with a $2,000 investment can initiate and adopt changes to the corporate
by-laws on any subject, not contrary to federal or state law, through the corporate
proxy statement.15 This is consistent with some of Professor Bebchuk‟s legal
writings which have urged that shareholders should have the right to mandate basic
changes in corporate direction without either persuading directors or conducting a
proxy contest to replace directors.16 Professor Bebchuk later withdrew these
proposals after the recipient companies asked the staff of the Division of
11

Bebchuk, Shareholders Set the Rules, supra note 6, at 1794, 1799, 1803; Bebchuk, Shareholder Power, supra
note 6, at 877-78, 895.
12 Bebchuk,
13

Shareholders Set the Rules, supra note 6, at 1802.

Bebchuk, The Myth, supra note 6, at 697-700.

14

See, e.g., Posting of Subodh Mishra to http://blog.riskmetrics.com/2008/01/ (Jan. 30 2007)
(reporting that companies have received more than ninety “say on pay” proposals for the 2008 proxy
season compared to forty-four such proposals received during the 2007 proxy season).
15

According to statistics reported in the RiskMetrics/ISS database, Professor Bebchuk submitted
binding or non-binding versions of this proposal to eleven companies: Consolidated Edison, Inc.,
Exxon Mobil Corp., The Home Depot, Inc., International Paper Co., McDonald‟s Corp., Omnicom
Group Inc., The Gap, Inc., El Paso Corp., General Motors Corp., Schering-Plough Corp. and Time
Warner Inc. Board Practices: The Structure of Boards of Directors at S&P 1,500 Companies, RiskMetrics
Group (2008).
16

See Bebchuk, The Myth, supra note 6, at 676-79; Bebchuk, Shareholders Set the Rules, supra note 6, at
1784-86, 1813; Bebchuk, Shareholder Power, supra note 6, at 836-37.
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Corporation Finance of the Securities and Exchange Commission for no-action
advice that the proposals could be excluded from the companies‟ proxy statements.17
At least one state legislature, that of North Dakota, embraced many of the
arguments of the activist community last year by adopting a new “investor friendly”
corporate statute, embodying virtually every item on the activist governance list,
including prescribing the acceptable terms and duration of a “poison pill.”18
Interestingly, North Dakota corporations are covered by the statute only if they opt
in to it.19 The stated purpose of the statute was to attract public companies from
outside the state that want to demonstrate that they are investor–friendly.20 North
Dakota offers this on a bargain basis by providing that the rate at which North
Dakota imposes the corporate franchise fee is equal to half the rate of the Delaware
franchise tax.21 In other words, corporations could soar to the top on the “goodgovernance” checklist while simultaneously racing to the bottom on cost. To date,
no corporation has taken up North Dakota‟s invitation. Perhaps the prospect of
17

See, e.g., Letter from Ronald O. Mueller, Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP, Counsel for Consolidated
Edison, Inc., to the Office of Chief Counsel, Division of Corporation Finance, Securities and
Exchange
Commission
(Feb.
5,
2008);
available
at
http://content.lawyerlinks.com/library/sec/sec_14a8/2008/consolidated_edison_020508.htm.
18

See N. D. CENT. CODE §§ 10-35-22 to -25 (2007) (providing the laws regarding publicly traded
corporations); see also id. at § 10-35-02 (providing definitional terms).
19

Id. at § 10-35-03(1) (“This chapter applies only to a publicly traded corporation meeting the
definition of a „publicly traded corporation‟ . . . during such time as its articles state it is governed by this
chapter.”) (emphasis added).
20

See generally David Marcus, A New Delaware?, THE DAILY DEAL, May 7, 2007,
http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/olin_center/corporate_governance/MediaMentions/05-0707_Deal.pdf (“The gurus of good governance are at it again. Long dissatisfied with what they see as
Delaware‟s pro-management bias, activist investors successfully lobbied the North Dakota state
legislature to pass an amendment to the state‟s corporate law code that includes a number of
shareholder-friendly governance provisions. Gov. John Hoeven signed the bill into law on April 12,
[2007,] thereby enabling a regime that provides for: majority voting; annual advisory votes by
shareholders on executive compensation; direct access to the proxy; and provisions for shareholder
approval of poison pills.”).
21 Compare

§ 10-35-28(3) (imposing of a fee of $60 “for each ten thousand shares of authorized capital
stock”) with DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 503 (2008) (imposing a scaled fee structure based on the
number of authorized shares or no–par capital value of the corporation). See generally Marcus, supra
note 20 (noting that North Dakota‟s law prescribed fees that were half of Delaware‟s fees).
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litigating issues of corporate law in Bismarck in the winter, before a judiciary more
accustomed to dealing with agricultural and natural resources matters, is not
appealing, even to corporations wanting to prove their openness to shareholder
influence.22
So, the question is: who has it right? Is Marty Lipton right to worry that the
good governance pendulum has swung so far that we are losing efficient, centralized
corporate decision-making and intelligent risk-taking to our economic detriment? Or
are Bebchuk and others right that corporate directors and “imperial” CEOs have
performed so poorly, and with so little heed to investor interests, that they must be
subjected to direct and potentially frequent shareholder interventions and discipline?
Looking at our current economic troubles and at the oft-repeated concern
that most corporate managers and directors did not see the sub-prime and credit
quality issues coming, one might certainly argue that some form of stricter
monitoring may have helped. However, it is unclear whether any of the
prescriptions of the shareholder activists would have been effective in this regard.
Would more frequent director elections, shareholder amendments to by-laws, annual
“say on pay” votes, or cheaper proxy contests have made managers and directors
more insightful and more conscious of the risks by sub-prime lending and
securitization in an overheated real estate market? The answer appears to be a
resounding “no.” In fact, the movements toward shareholder-centrism, director
insecurity, and enhancing the power of activists who try to change management,
might well have increased the pressure on management to produce “good” shortterm financial results each quarter, rather than to focus on longer term strategy and
thoughtful assessment of risks.
Early reports indicate that, of the major financial institutions, the one that
was most prescient, and has, at least so far, avoided the worst of the problems of the
current situation, is Goldman Sachs, which has strong centralized management, a
cohesive board and little exposure to takeover risk.23 This example shows the
success of Goldman Sachs‟ implementation of the director-centric model.
22

See generally Marcus, supra note 20 (discussing Delaware‟s sophisticated, specialized courts, in
comparison with North Dakota‟s general court system).
23

See generally Katie Brenner, Mike Mayo on Battered Banks, FORTUNE, Nov. 27, 2007 (noting that
“[a]mong the investment banks, Goldman Sachs . . . management has done an excellent job”); Ruth
Sunderland, Money Meltdown: The Unstoppables: Goldman: Is It Really Glittering?, The Observer, Dec. 16,
2007 (noting that “Goldman has avoided the worst of the mortgage mayhem in the US”).
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Surely, Lipton has a point when he worries that a corporate environment in
which management is more monitored and criticized than advised by directors who
are selected by, and meeting directly and regularly with, forceful shareholders may be
an environment that does not lead to sound decision-making and effective longrange planning.24 A management that is always looking over its shoulder may not do
a good job of seeing the road ahead and charting a course that avoids potholes and
maximizes benefits.
The genius of the corporate business model, as recognized even by Berle and
Means in their criticism of unaccountable managers, centers on the idea that
investors can pool large amounts of capital, limiting their liability for loss to the
capital they contribute, in an enterprise that is centrally and, presumably, more
effectively and nimbly led by professional managers.25 In this model, both the
managers and the directors who monitor them, have fiduciary duties to the investors
and face some risk of personal liability beyond their investment if those duties are
not met.26
Even moderate corporate governance observers who disagree with the level
of Lipton‟s alarm, such as former Delaware Chief Justice Norman Veasey and Ira
Millstein, are concerned that we not upset the historic balance that has generally
worked well between the limited role and limited liability of shareholder investors
24 See

Lipton, supra note 3 (stating that “[t]here is no justification for revolutionizing corporate law and
corporate practices so that shareholders replace directors as the fundamental arbiters of corporate
policy”); see also Martin Lipton, Some Thoughts for Boards of Directors in 2008 at 7 (Dec. 6, 2007), available
at
http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2007/12/10/some-thoughts-for-boards-of-directors-in2008/ [hereinafter Lipton, Some Thoughts] (positing that “[w]hile direct communications with
shareholders is an important and often uniquely effective element of a company‟s response to
activism, the advent of working groups [or] a corporate officer position whose role is to appease
shareholder activists heralds yet another new avenue of shareholder influence into boardroom
deliberations”).
25

See ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE
PROPERTY 131 (Rev. ed. 1967) (stating that “through various statutory changes, general permission to
incorporate and inclusion in charters of increasing grants of power to the management, the
stockholders‟ position, once a controlling factor in the running of the [corporation], has declined from
extreme strength to practical impotence. . . . It is fairly probable that the reason for the weakening of
the shareholder‟s position lay as much in his inability to manage as in the obvious willingness of the
„control‟ to take over the task.”).
26

Id.
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and the active role, fiduciary duties, and potential liability of managers.27 This “quid
pro quo” notion of shareholders exchanging the rights to manage the company for
limited liability while the directors manage the company and owe an ongoing duty to
the shareholders creates the balance that both shareholders and directors that
benefits both shareholders and directors.28
Having addressed what other observers of the corporate governance scene
think, one may well ask what I think. The remainder of this Article explains my
position.
First, the meeting between several of Pfizer‟s independent directors and
some of the company‟s largest shareholders, which occurred a few months after the
June 2007 announcement despite Lipton‟s concerns, was not a “sky is falling” event
or an emblem of the end of director-centric governance and the traditional corporate
economic model. Rather, the meeting was a perfectly understandable response to
issues at Pfizer on various fronts, including executive compensation and product
pipeline issues, which had received extensive press attention and concerned Pfizer
27

See, e.g., John F. Olson, Professor Bebchuk’s Brave New World: A Reply to “The Myth of the Shareholder
Franchise”, 93 VA. L. REV. 773, 783 (2007) (noting that Professor Bebchuk‟s “concerns about [issues
such as] executive compensation excesses can best be addressed by greatly enhanced disclosure
requirements within the present director nominations and proxy regime, rather than by fundamentally
altering the balance between directors and shareholders”); E. Norman Veasey, The Stockholder Franchise
Is Not a Myth: A Response to Professor Bebchuk, 93 VA. L. REV. 811, 811-12 (2007) (arguing that “[w]hat
is not needed at this juncture is a lurching change in the name of „reform‟ that might upset the existing
balance of law and culture”); Lipton, Some Thoughts, supra note 24, at 3 (stating that when “decisionmaking power shifts from boards to activist shareholders and shareholder advocates, boards are
increasingly vulnerable to pressures for short-term share price performance and other agendas”);
Corporate Advisory Governance Memorandum of Ira M. Millstein, Holly J. Gregory & Rebecca C.
Grapsas, Rethinking Board and Shareholder Engagement in 2008 at 3 (Jan. 2008), available at
http://www.weil.com/news/pubdetail.aspx?pub=6382 (stating that “[w]e may well miss the
opportunity to achieve lasting balance in the corporate power structure if shareholders fail to
recognize and respect that there are limits on the issues that are appropriate for shareholder
initiatives”); Memorandum of Ira M. Millstein et al., Meetings Between Directors and Institutional Investors on
Governance
Matters
Are
a
Constructive
Step
(Jun.
29,
2007),
available
at
http://www.shareholderforum.com/op/Program/20070629b_report.htm (stating that “[c]ompanies
have an interest in moving their relationships with large shareholders . . . to a positive and
constructive tone”).
28 Corporate

Advisory Governance Memorandum of Ira M. Millstein, Holly J. Gregory & Rebecca C.
Grapsas, supra note 27 (“[T]he corporation, by law is „managed by or under the direction of‟ the
board. Indeed, this legal empowerment of the board goes hand in hand with the limited liability that
shareholders enjoy.”).
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investors. Importantly, the meeting was an initiative of the Pfizer board, undertaken
to gather information and listen to key investors; it was not a decision-making forum.
Thus, the meeting was director-centric in that it was not the result of a referendum
or a shareholder-initiated by-law, but a decision by the board of directors, fully and
publicly supported by the Pfizer CEO, Jeff Kindler.29 Pfizer is not the only public
company that found such meetings useful. The Business Roundtable 2007 survey of
governance practices indicated that nearly thirty-eight percent of member companies
had informal meetings between directors and shareholders during the year.30 Thus,
director-initiated and, in some cases, shareholder–initiated meetings for the purpose
of having directors listen to investor concerns or answer questions, so long as they
are not a vehicle for selective disclosure of potentially market-moving information,
are appropriate and consistent with the corporate model.
Furthermore, the trends to majority voting for directors or declassification of
staggered boards are concerning.31 A good case can be made that the stability
provided by staggered board terms benefits investors by providing a more stable
platform and better directorial continuity for long-range planning and dealing with
management succession issues. The success of McDonald‟s in adapting to changing
markets and in dealing with several recent, unexpected CEO losses as the result of
sudden illness, may, in part, be attributable to the stability of its classified board. 32
However, the declassification train has left the station and we will all survive.
29 Press

Release, Pfizer Inc., supra note 1.

30

Business Roundtable Corporate Governance Survey, Key Findings (Oct. 2007), available at
http://www.businessroundtable.org//publications/publication.aspx?qs=2A86BF807822B0F19D444
84.
31 As

of February 2006, only 16% of S&P 500 companies had either a director resignation policy or a
majority voting standard; by November 2007, this percentage had jumped to approximately 66%.
Claudia H. Allen, Study of Majority Voting in Director Elections, (Nov. 12, 2007), available at
http://www.ngelaw.com/files/upload/majoritystudy111207.pdf.
In 2007, 40% of S&P 500
companies had classified boards compared to 45% in 2006 and 53% in 2005. Board Practices: The
Structure of Boards of Directors at S&P 1,500 Companies, supra note 15.
32

See McDonald‟s Corporation, 2004 Summary Annual Report, at 5 (2004), available at
64.26.27.40/interactive/mcd2004summaryannualreport/download.php?fn=mcd2004summaryannualr
eport.pdf (noting that CEO Jim Cantalupo died of a heart attack in April 2004 and successor CEO
Charlie Bell stepped down from his position seven months later due to illness); see also Parija
Bhatnagar,
Sad
Day
at
McDonald’s,
MONEY,
Apr.
19,
2004,
available
at
http://money.cnn.com/2004/04/19/news/fortune500/mcdonalds_ceo/index.htm (discussing the
death of McDonald‟s CEO Jim Cantalupo and the appointment of CEO Charlie Bell).
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Neither board declassification nor majority voting trends threaten the life of the
successful corporate model.
Unlike Lipton, I am not deeply disturbed that shareholders might express an
after-the-fact view on the board‟s success in setting executive pay by comparing their
corporation with those in other countries. There are some downsides in making this
comparison, primarily the stifling of innovation and homogenization of pay and
incentive plans to meet whatever model Risk Metrics / ISS creates. However, in
view of the recent concern over pay issues, this may be attractive to boards and
managers as a way of moving away from an undue focus on what is, ultimately, an
issue of modest importance for most companies.
Of greater concern are the proposals that strike directly at centralized
management by the board of directors, including proposals for direct shareholder
nominations of board candidates and unlimited power to amend by–laws through
the corporate proxy statement and by corporate funding of proxy contests.33 Under
the new North Dakota statute, shareholders can initiate and adopt an amendment to
the certificate of incorporation, the basic contract between investors and managers,
without board involvement.34 These steps are a threat to stable, effective
management and to the implementation of valid long-range goals for the enterprise.
Such “reforms” constitute a step too far down a slippery slope. Such
investor “rights” are more consistent with a general partnership than with the
corporate form or a limited partnership. Legitimate questions are raised as to
whether investors with such powers should continue to have limited liability when
things go wrong in the business or the enterprise engages in unlawful conduct.35
More importantly, however, such changes create a substantial risk that boards of
directors and CEOs will no longer see themselves as primarily responsible for the

33

See Bebchuk, Shareholder Power, supra note 6, at 857, 865 (arguing that shareholders should be able to
initiate and approve amendments to the articles of incorporation, to have access to the corporate
ballot to nominate directors, and to have certain campaign expenses reimbursed by the company).
34
35

N. D. CENT. CODE § 10-35-15 (2007).

For a further discussion of the correlation between shareholders‟ involvement in the management
of the company and the extent of shareholder liability, see Iman Anabtawi & Lynn A. Stout, Fiduciary
Duties for Activist Shareholders, 60 STAN. L. REV. (forthcoming Mar. 2008), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1089606.
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direction and success of the enterprise, but rather as mere agents implementing
shareholder decisions.
Further such provisions are, at least in part, a dismantling of defenses that
have given boards of directors tools to maintain leverage either to refuse an offer or
get a better deal for investors when an uninvited takeover proposal is received. Such
steps will clearly increase the leverage of hedge funds and other opportunistic
investments with short term “quick profit and run” goals. In turn, these investments
may lead to defensive, short-term, less-than-optimal decision making and long–term
damage to the effectiveness of the corporate model.
Listening to investors is important. When directors and managers listen,
different voices and disparate ranges of investor interest, from immediate
gratification to long-term growth, will be heard. However, if corporate governance
reform moves beyond listening and thoughtful response, abandoning the traditional,
successful model where shareholders do not manage and their decisions are generally
limited to elections of directors and approval of fundamental changes in ownership
rights, the economic efficiency of our corporate model may indeed be damaged.
In challenging times, such as today, we need boards of directors who can
counsel, warn, and challenge corporate managers in a collaborative manner rather
than directors who are merely agents acting on shareholder instructions or “hall
monitors” guarding against management misconduct. In the post Sarbanes-Oxley
environment, there is an important monitoring role for the board. However, truly
effective boards of directors do more than monitor management they also serve as
vehicles for conveying shareholder concerns and desires. The boards are more than
mere “agents,” carrying out detailed instructions of shareholder “principals.” Rather,
members of boards of directors are fiduciaries who, by law, are charged to manage
or provide for the management of the business and affairs of the corporation. That
role is the core concept of the modern business corporation and is central to
effective corporate governance. Accordingly, it should not be diminished or
neglected.

